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Full Idea
I am quite flexible on epistemic terminology, and am even willing to grant that a supermarket door can 'know' that someone is approaching.
Gist of Idea
It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching
Source
Ernest Sosa (Beyond internal Foundations to external Virtues [2003], 6.6)
Book Ref
Bonjour,L/Sosa,E: 'Epistemic Justification' [Blackwells 2003], p.115
A Reaction
I take this amazing admission to be a hallmark of externalism. Sosa must extend this to thermostats. So flowers know the sun has come out. This is knowledge without belief. Could the door ever be 'wrong'?
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |